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Fig. 1. The system interface of iConVis: (a) Guarantee Network Explorer. The view facilities the overview and zooming at level-
of-details of the guarantee networks using a network tessellation layout. It provides intuitive and metaphorical symbols (Contagion
Effect Badge) of contagion risk to support selecting the interest networks. (b) Contagion Effect Matrix. It gives detailed risk contagion
patterns and quantified severity. (c) Chain Instance Explorer. It supports further narrow down the search space of the contagious
instances from a financial perspective. (d) Node Instance Explorer. It visuals the finest-grain information on demand.
Abstract—Groups of enterprises can guarantee each other and form complex networks to obtain loans from commercial banks.
During economic slowdown period, the corporate default may spread like a virus and lead to large-scale defaults or even systemic
financial crises. To help the financial regulatory authorities and banks manage the risk brought by the networked loans, we identified
the default contagion risk as a pivotal issue to take preventive measures, and develop iConVis, an interactive visual analysis tool,
to facilitate the closed-loop analysis process. A novel financial metric – contagion effect is formulated to quantify the infectious
consequence of the guarantee chains in the network. Based on the metric, we design and implement a serial of novel and coordinated
views to address the analysis the financial problem. Experts evaluated the system using real-world financial data. The proposed
approach grants them the ability to overturn the previous ad hoc analysis methodology and extends the coverage of the conventional
Capital Accord in the banking industry.
Index Terms—Networked-guarantee Loans, Regtech, Risk management, Visual analytics, Complex network
1 INTRODUCTION
Regulatory technology (or RegTech) aiming to enhance transparency,
consistency and addresses a regulatory challenge faced by a finan-
cial services provider, including monitoring, reporting, and compli-
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ance obligations has become leading developed fields in FinTech [3].
RegTech development is changing the nature of financial markets, ser-
vices [2]. The rapid development of FinTech and RegTech raises the
awareness of visual analytics and artificial intelligence in this area. As
the chief economist of the Bank of England, Andy Haldane imagined
the future of RegTech and FinTech might have a global map of finan-
cial flows, charting spillovers, and correlations [46].
Networked-guarantee Loans, a unique financial and banking phe-
nomenon in some countries, are attracting increased attention from the
regulators and banks. When the enterprises back each other for loan
application, they form complex directed networks. Highlighted by the
complex background of the growth period, the structural adjustment
of the pain period and the early stage of the stimulus period, structural
and deep-level contradictions have emerged in the economic develop-
ment system. During the economic slowdown period, the corporate
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default 1 may spread like a virus and lead to large-scale defaults or
even systemic financial crises, and the need for risk management is
more urgent than ever before. Monitoring the financial status is so
complicated that it is usually only after a capital chain rupture that
the regulators can study a case in depth. The regulators and banks
are seeking to utilize the data-driven and visual analytics approach to
manage the risk brought by the networked loans. However, the public
research output for the problem is still relatively limited.
We work closely with financial experts and conduct research on the
networked-guarantee loans risk management problem. We identify the
default contagion risk for the networked loans as an important yet un-
explored interdisciplinary research problem. Data-driven and visual
analytics based approach can provide fresh insights into assessing the
contagion risk and taking preventive measures. In this paper, we pro-
pose iConVis, a novel visual analytics approach, to help the financial
experts in-depth analysis of the default contagion risk problem.
We summarize the main contributions of this work as follows:
• We discover and highlight eight interpretable contagion chain
patterns by analysing the real-world bank loan records. The pat-
terns have different contagion characteristics and that lay the ba-
sis of quantitative contagion risk assessments (contagion effect)
and our visualisation design.
• We propose a systematic data-driven & visual analytic approach
for the contagion risk problem under the framework of the
closed-loop analysis process. Our approach grants financial ex-
perts the ability to overturn previous ad-hoc methodology.
• We develop iConVis, an interactive visual analytics tool for the
contagion risk analysis problem in the networked loans. Sev-
eral novel visualisation and interaction design are proposed: the
guarantee network tessellation layout and flower-petal-zooming
interaction design to overcome the visual clutters; the contagion
effect badge to visual symbolling the quantified contagion risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
works involving different aspects related to our problem; Section 3
details the background and requirement analysis of our approaches;
Section 4 describes the methods and system. In Section 5, We present
the results of case studies and expert feedback to evaluate the system.
Discussions and conclusions are described in Section 6, Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Data and visual analytic technologies are extensively applied in the
financial risk management problems such as in the domain of macro-
prudential oversight, fraud detection in online transaction and invest-
ment [23, 16, 18, 38]. In this section, we first introduce the capi-
tal accord, an important risk management framework to the banking
industry and then the works on the interdisciplinary of financial risk
management and data visual analytics.
Capital Accord aiming to enhance understanding of key supervi-
sory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a serial of recom-
mendations on banking laws and regulations (Basel I, II, III) [13]. The
principles have been widely accepted by the banks around the world.
Under Basel II, a serious of parameters also named as internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach [42]) are used to calculate the economic capital
or regulatory capital for a banking institution. 1) Probability of default
(PD). Default probabilities may be estimated from a historical defaults
data, observable prices of credit default swaps, bonds, and options on
the common stock using machine learning algorithms like Decision
trees, Logistic regression, Support vector machine, Neural networks,
Genetic programming, Ensemble methods, and many other machine
learning methods [5, 26]. In credit risk management, the standard as-
sumption is that a loan is considered to default when the client past
due at least three months. 2) Loss given default (LGD). It refers to the
share of an asset that lost if a borrower defaults. Loss given default is
facility-specific because such losses maybe influenced by key transac-
tion characteristics such as the presence of collateral and the degree of
1Financial terminology, referring the business fails to fulfill an obligation,
especially to repay a loan or to appear in a court of law.
subordination. 3) Exposure at default (EAD). It can be defined as the
gross exposure under a facility upon default of an obligor. 4) Expected
loss (EL) with the above risk settings, they can be formulated as the
product of PD, LGD, and EAD.
Macro-prudential oversight aims to measure systemic risks
timely and accurately [38]. Many works of visualisation in macro-
prudential oversight have been done within the financial sector. The
foremost work is by the volatility laboratory of Nobel Laureate Robert
Engle. His group provides online real-time measurement, modelling,
and forecasting of financial volatility and correlations with systemic
risks with interactive classic charts such as bar chart, Box plot, map
chart, and other prime ones [17]. Within the cross-sector of machine
learning and financial stability, Peter Sarlin published a serious of
work on visual systemic risk analytic cooperating with the European
Central Bank, International Monetary Fund and some other interna-
tional banks [36]. The self-organizing map, a neural-network-based
unsupervised learning method and visualisation tool with the power of
simultaneous clustering and projection, is utilized into a serial of work
on the evaluation and visualisation of financial stability [39, 40, 37].
The self organizing map based financial stability was also extended
with a novel time dimension to decompose and identify temporal struc-
tural changes in macro-financial data around the global financial cri-
sis [38]. Network visualisation is employed to represent the bank in-
terrelations through financial discussion data [11].
Fraud detection of transactions are always highly concerned by
the banks [16]. Advanced Detection System (ADS) is one of the earli-
est risk visualisation systems which monitors trades and quotations in
the Nasdaq stock market by identifying patterns and practices of the
behaviour of potential regulatory interest [24, 25]. Wirevis employs
coordinated specific keywords visualisation within wire transactions
that were used to detect suspicious accounts and transactions suspi-
cious behaviours [7]. 3D treemap is introduced to monitor real-time
stock market performance and identify a particular stock that has pro-
duced unusual trading patterns and trading network visualisation with
suspected trading patterns matching is used to identify fraud patterns,
suspected traders (attackers), and attack plans [21].
Network based visual analysis. Robert Pienta et al. customize
the query method of the network and help users to quickly explore the
network by reducing the query results and clustering [34]. Timothy
Major et al. propose a unit visualisation method for large-scale, multi-
variable relational data, taking into account the attributes and network
structure exploration [27]. Benjamin Bach et al. propose a univer-
sal confluent drawings algorithm to bundle edges to simplify the net-
work keeping the main skeleton [4]. Chen propose a structure-based
exploratory method to support the effective exploration of large net-
works [8]. Arlind Nocaj propose a preprocessing method for small-
world networks, which can automatically select the optimal thresh-
old, filter out the slight edges in the small-world network, and obtain
the optimal graph skeleton [32]. Carolina Nobre propose to visualise
group networks based on division and hierarchical progression [31].
Network based visual analysis in the financial sector Network
algorithms enable the exploration of crucial relationships and associa-
tions between a broad set of objects. For example, customers, markets,
banks, and global markets connect into a network [3, 22]. Graph draw-
ing algorithms, as well as the financial domain knowledge, are bor-
rowed to visualise and assessment. Maybe the force-directed layout
is the most extensively utilised in financial area; Rnnqvist and Sarlin
collect text data from online financial forums and generate and visu-
alised a co-mention bank network (interbank network) [35]. Walter
Didimo et al. propose VISFAN, a financial activity network visual ex-
ploration tool for discovering financial crimes, like money laundering
and frauds [14]. Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun Chen discussed criminal
network analysis and visualisation, a very close domain. The insights
include: the social network analysis can be used to analyse interac-
tion patterns; the criminal network can be partitioned into subgroups
of individuals by the centralities in the network such as node degree,
betweenness, and closeness [47, 15]. Ronald Heijmans and others use
animation to visualise and analyse the large transaction networks of
the daily Dutch overnight money market [20]. Dan use force-directed
graph visualisation to analysis Bitcoin transaction activity and explore
dynamically generated patterns of algorithmic behaviour [28]. We
are the first to identify and report an visual analytic framework for the
untapped risk management problem in networked loans [30, 10, 9].
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present the necessary background of the unique
financial phenomenon, and then report the major concerns from the
loan assessment experts; finally, give the summary of the analysis tasks
and design rationales based on the real-world motivations.
3.1 Background of the Networked Loans
The origin of networked-guarantee loans can be illustrated by Fig. 2.
It is a common scenario that small businesses wish to get loans from
commercial banks, and usually, they lack the necessary security re-
quired by the banks. In this case, they are allowed to seek a guarantee
from other businesses. In practice, there can be more than one guar-
antor per loan transaction, and there may be multiple loan transactions
for a single guarantor in a period. Once the loan is approved, the
company can usually immediately get the full amount of the loan and
begins to repay the bank regularly via an instalment plan until the end
of the loan agreement.
4. Regular repayment
2. Loan Contract
1. Guarantee Contract
3. Receive Fund
Fig. 2. A typical loan guarantee process includes four major steps.
We work closely with two loan assessment experts to understand
the real challenges. In particular, Expert Ea is a senior financial regu-
latory officer with more than five years of experience in the guaranteed
loan problem and has published several important relevant investiga-
tion reports. Expert Eb comes from our partner bank. He has ten years
of loan approval experience and can access the complete data set. The
financial experts divide the default contagious and the corresponding
response interventions into four phases (Fig. 3).
Introduction or emergence 
(External shocks and 
financial stress)
Localized 
Transmission
Amplification Reduced 
Transmission
Anticipation ContainmentEarly detection 
and foresting
Control and 
mitigation
Elimination or 
Eradication
Response Interventions
Default Contagious Phases
Fig. 3. Default contagious phases and response interventions. The red
nodes refer to the default company and the dashed nodes/links are the
default contagion chain.
The default contagious are usually triggered by accidental default
to introduce risk, and since it is obligation contracts, the default conta-
gious may spread to its adjacent nodes (the one providing guarantee).
Anticipating how the debt default may spread is critical in taking re-
sponse interventions. An appropriate guarantee union can reduce the
risk of default, but in practice, significant contagious damage can still
occur in the networked companies. In case of the economy down, the
default may be amplified as large-scale corporate defaults caused by
the side effect of the network. In this case, the guarantee network can
be alienated from the “joint assistance group” as a “breach of con-
tract”. When some companies face operational difficulties and the cri-
sis may see a domino effect: the default can spread rapidly across
the network, and it could put a large number of companies in an un-
favourable position. The systematic crisis may happen, and at this
stage, necessary control and mitigation are highly required. After the
elimination or eradication stage, the guarantee network may be split
into several smaller ones, with some companies bankrupted, and the
transmission is reduced. Next, we summarize the main concerns of
the experts and outline the requirements in the following subsection.
Concern 1: Basel-accord based risk management system may be
not well suitable for the networked loans, as the networked relation-
ship is unique and exceed the hypothesis [13]. It is urgent and essential
to adapt the old or establish new risk measurements for the problem.
Concern 2: Particular attention should be paid to the contagion risk
to prevent the large-scale corporate defaults brought by the networked
loans. Usually, the accidental default is tolerable while the large-scale
defaults or systemic financial crisis is to be firmly prevented. However,
it is unclear at the current stage that how the contagion spread in the
guarantee networks, how vulnerable the nodes are and how suscep-
tible the default is to spread. The regulators and the banks seek to
monitor/assess the spreading status via data-driven and visual analyt-
ics approach to resolve the risks and ensure financial stability.
3.2 Summary of Analysis Tasks
We summarize the following analysis tasks, addressing the significant
concerns of experts and supporting to assess the crisis level and gain
insight into taking precautions to resolve potential financial risks.
T.1 Explore the networks at different level-of-details, locating the
interested network quickly. Motivated by the expert concerns
and the technical challenges when analysing massive guarantee
data, the system should support quickly locating the interest net-
works and analysing them at level of different details.
T.2 Understand how the default contagious may spread across the
guarantee network, extract the contagion patterns. The for-
ward approach to understanding the default spreading is to simu-
late the situation by establishing virus-epidemic models such as
in [33]. However, it is impossible in our case due to the shortage
of empirical default data. In a data-driven perspective, identify-
ing the potential contagion chain, extracting the patterns of them
can also provide insights for the ultimate goal of taking precau-
tions to avoid and resolve systematic financial risks.
T.3 Analysis contagion chain instances. It should support the risk
assessment and evaluation case-by-case as there exist multiple
contagion chain instances even for the same pattern. Appropriate
quantitative indicators are helpful to make careful comparisons.
T.4 Provide novel and objective risk measurements/indicators tai-
lored for the networked loans. The classic Basel-accord based
risk measurements are not well suitable for the problem as it is
based on the assumption that these are giant players on the mar-
ket and that they are independent. It is necessary to set up a novel
objective risk indicator for our problem.
T.5 Quantifying risk spread level and identifying the key nodes.
Inspired from the concept of super-spreaders in epidemiol-
ogy [41], a few corporations are prone to “superspreading
events”, given the right conditions, can ignite explosive epi-
demics. Moreover, such volatility also means that outbreaks are
more likely to fizzle out relatively quickly. Identifying the super-
spreaders (key nodes) is crucial for the regulator to take preven-
tive measures in the Networked-guarantee Loans.
3.3 Design Rationales
Based on analysis tasks, we declare the reasons behind the design de-
cisions in this section.
DR 1 Scalable and appropriate layout networks visualisation.
The networks constructed from the real-world data set are com-
posed of massive nodes. The system should have a scalable
massive-nodes network layout to avoid severe visual clutter with
sufficient performance to enable sophisticated interactions. Ex-
perts are familiar with the force-directed layout as in our previous
work addressed [30]. The layout should avoid excessive occlu-
sion and visual clutter caused by excessive node coverage but
with expensive computational resources. In practice, the target
users may wish to analysis interest networks at level-of-details
on a compact arrangement for the over three thousand indepen-
dent networks by interactions such as magnify, filter, and selec-
tions (T.1-T.5).
DR 2 Focusing on the contagion chains. Identify and discover
the default contagion patterns in the guarantee network (T.2),
and propose appropriate contagion risk indicators/measurements
based on the patterns (T.4) and provide intuitive visualisation
will help a fast evaluation the priority of analysing.
DR 3 Appropriate symbols and colour mapping for intuitive
metaphor. Intuitive representation is an essential element of
most visualisation systems. Proper visual metaphors can help
experts reduce the visual burden and improve their understand-
ing of the real situation (T.1).
4 METHOD
This section describes the method of the visual analytic system.
4.1 Overview of the Approach
Motivated by the analysis tasks, we design and implement iConVis
to support financial experts to explore the contagion risk for the net-
worked loans interactively. Fig. 4 gives an overview of the approach.
Contagion Pattern Analysis 
Data Processing 
Edge table Contagion Chain TableNode Table
Chain Pattern discovery
Pattern Contagion Risk 
Quantification
Network Contagion Risk 
Quantification
`
Financial Expert
Visual Analysis Loop
Guarantee Network 
Analysis
Contagion Chain 
Pattern Analysis
Contagion Chain 
Instance Analysis
Corporation 
Analysis
 Contagion Score:
Fig. 4. Overview of the approach. It mainly includes: (a) Data prepro-
cessing; (b) Contagion pattern analysis; (c) Visual analysis loop.
It mainly includes three steps: 1) Data preprocessing. Raw bank
loan records are cleaned and reorganised into the node table (Corpo-
ration profiles), edge table (Guarantee relations), and contagion chain
table. 2) Contagion pattern analysis: we employ unsupervised learn-
ing based approach to extract contagion chains structure patterns, and
then propose a novel financial metric to quantify the contagion risk
of the chains and the networks. The patterns and the metrics form
the basis of our visual design and support the financial analysis. 3)
The visual analysis loop. We design an visual interface that is closely-
coupled with the financial risk management tasks and knowledge to
support closed-loop analysis process and iterative level of detail ex-
ploration. We describe details of data and contagion pattern analysis
in the subsequence subsection and describe the visualisation design
and interaction in the next section.
4.2 Data
In this work, we collect ten-year loan data from cooperating commer-
cial bank and build the guarantee network. The names of the cus-
tomers in the records are encrypted. In the record preprocess phase,
by joining the tables, we obtain records related to the corporation ID
and guarantee contract. We then construct the guarantee network.
As Fig. 4 shows, at the data preprocessing step, we clean and reor-
ganize the record data into three main tables: 1) Node table is about the
corporation profiles (business type, size, and registered capital) and the
primary key is the corporation ID; 2) Edge table is the directed guar-
antee relations between corporations (nodes in the node table). It also
includes the guarantee amount between them as weights of the edges.
Fig. 5 gives the overview of the real-world data set, with each node is
representing an enterprise and the link direction representing the guar-
antee relationship. More than twenty thousand businesses and more
than three thousand independent networks co-exist. One can see that
the networks are overlapping and few insights can be drawn. When
zooming in, one can see there are lots of directed sub graph microstruc-
ture. Some of the prime ones are familiarised by the loan assessment
domain experts [30, 9, 10], but the collective financial properties of
those microstructure are unclear and need to be explored.
…
Fig. 5. Overview of the real-world data set. When zoom in, we can
observe lots directed subgraph microstructures.
3) Contagion chain table. We define the contagion chain (Chain
of contagion) as the subgraph that the default may spread. If we can
obtain and understand the contagion risk pattern, we may be possible
to understand how the default risk may spread across the guarantee
network and take preventive measures to prevent any potential occur-
rence of large-scale defaults (T.1). The contagion chain table is recon-
structed from the node table and edge table and heavily used in this
work. Contagion chain, different from the guarantee chain, has the
opposite direction of the arrows. In practice, the guarantee network is
split into several subgraphs of contagious (noted as contagion chains)
when we reverse the directions of the arrows. We apply breadth-first
traversal algorithm and generate a serial of subgraphs and stored as
contagion chain files in JSON format. Fig. 6 gives an illustration ex-
ample where (a) is the guarantee network; (b) is the contagion chain
when node A default and spread the risk; (c) gives all possible conta-
gion chains. It is noted that although some of the chain are subgraphs
of another ones, all the chains are analysed equally as each node may
be the first default one and spread the risk.
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Fig. 6. Guarantee network and default contagion chains.
4.3 Contagion Chain Pattern Analysis
The contagion chain pattern analysis is the basis of our approach and
critical to understand the contagion properties of the network. In this
section, we apply unsupervised learning approach to extract the pat-
terns, interpret their financial meaning, and quantify the risk brought
by each kinds of contagion patterns in the following sections.
The contagion chains are subgraphs, and we extract network infor-
mation propagation related attributes to construct the contagion chain
features. In this way, each contagion chain is represented by a five-
dimensional vector. In detail, the attributes include: Number of nodes
and edges of the contagion chain, noted as N(ci) and E(ci). Density of
the contagion chain, noted as D(ci). It is defined as a ratio of the num-
ber of edges to the number of possible edges in a network with nodes.
It measures the proportion of possible ties which are actualized among
the members of a network. Average clustering coefficient of the con-
tagion chain, noted Ci. It is computed as the average of the clustering
coefficients Ci of all the nodes in the chain. It is closely related to the
transitivity of a graph and an indictor of a small world or not. Average
shortest-path length, noted as lG. It is calculated by finding the shortest
path between all pairs of nodes, and taking the average over all paths
of the length thereof. It gives the number of steps it takes to get from
one member of the network to another and measures the efficiency of
information or mass transport on a network.
We choose to use spectral clustering for the contagion chain struc-
ture pattern mining. The approach frequently outperforms the tradi-
tional ones such as k-means or single linkage, especially in graph-
based clustering tasks [44]. Besides, it can be solved efficiently by
standard linear algebra methods. There are three major steps:
1. Create the similarity graph between the contagion chains. We
choose to fully connected graph in connection with the Gaus-
sian similarity function to transform a given set x1, ...,xn of data
points with pairwise similarities si, j or pairwise distances di, j
into a graph G = (V,E).
2. Compute the first k eigenvectors of its Laplacian matrix to define
a feature vector for each contagion chain. The graph Laplacian
matrix is defined as L = D−W , where adjacency matrix W is
the weight between the vertices of the graph, and D is the diag-
onal degree matrix. It is proven that the matrix L has as many
eigenvalues zero as there are connected components (clusters),
and the corresponding eigenvectors are the indicator vectors of
the connected components.
3. Run k-means on these features to separate objects into k classes.
Projecting the points into a non-linear embedding enhances the
cluster-properties in the data, so that they can be trivially de-
tected. In particular, the simple k-means clustering algorithm
has no difficulties to detect the clusters in this new representa-
tion with the estimation of k when the eigenvalues are zero.
We report the eight basic contagion chain patterns discovered by
the above approach in Fig. 7. The outbreak (default crisis) maybe start
from the node in red and spread in the guarantee network in the eight
patterns. In detail, they are:
P.1 Direct contagion pattern. It is the basic contagion pattern where
the default can only be spread to its adjacent (one) node and then
the contagion will be stopped.
P.2 Single chain contagion pattern. It is usually extended from
the direct contagion pattern with more nodes are involved into
the contagion chain. The default crisis can only spread across
the single chain in a same direction. It is worth noting that the
length of the entire single strand is arbitrary and all the chains in
such a structure are categorized into this pattern.
P.3 Mutual contagion pattern. It describes the situation in which
two corporations simultaneously guarantee each other (mutual
guarantees) and obtain funds from a bank. Both nodes are frag-
ile, because no matter which one encounter default crisis, the
other will be affected.
P.4 Mutual-ext contagion pattern. It is usually extended from
the mutual contagion pattern when the contagion chain involves
other nodes.
P.5 Loop-mutual contagion pattern. It is a loop structure when
three or more nodes are simultaneously guarantee each other.
Such structure is more vulnerable as any default crisis may
spread to all the nodes in the loop.
P.6 Loop-mutual-ext contagion pattern. It is usually extended
from the loop-mutual contagion pattern when the contagion
chain involves other nodes.
P.7 Star contagion pattern. The default crisis of one node will
affect lots of other nodes and then the contagion will be stopped.
It can be occurred when some corporations provide guarantee to
a same (weak) corporation, the default may be spread to all the
companies that provide supports.
P.8 Star-ext contagion pattern. It is extended from the star conta-
gion pattern with more complex structures involved. The default
of a node may be spread to several other order nodes.
P.8 Star-ext contagionP.7 Star contagionP.6 loop-mutual-ext contagionP.5 loop-mutual  contagion
P.4 mutual-ext contagionP.3 mutual contagionP.2 Single chain contagionP.1 Direct contagion
Fig. 7. The eight typical contagion chain patterns discovered
It can be observed that the patterns are gradually complicated with
more nodes involved or more complex guarantee relationships. In
practice, the contagion chains are the combinations of them, and a
network may have several instances of the same pattern. Fig. 8 gives
the example of the P.8 pattern detected on two guarantee networks.
The default may spread across the chain in red and then stop.
Fig. 8. The contagion chains in pattern P.8 on real independent guaran-
tee networks
We can also observe these contagion patterns fall into four types
by the behaviour of contagion: single chain, mutual contagious, loop
contagious, star contagious. Based on the behaviour of contagion, we
propose quantification for contagion risk assessment, and more details
will be given in the next Section.
5 VISUALISATION DESIGN AND INTERACTION
In this section, we describe the interface of the iConVis system that
supports financial experts to interactively and iteratively explore and
explain the contagion risk for Networked-guarantee Loans. we de-
signed the four coordinated views (Fig 1) to facility the closed-loop
analysis process and iterative level of detail exploration, following
Shneiderman’s mantra.
5.1 The Guarantee Network Explorer
The Guarantee Network Explorer (GNE) view facilities the overview
and zooming at level-of-details of the guarantee networks using a net-
work tessellation layout. It provides intuitive and metaphorical sym-
bols of contagion risk (through Contagious Effect Badge described in
Section 5.2) to support the selection by financial interests. The view
usually works as the starting analysis point and a set of interactive
tools are provided to enhance the in-depth analysis of each network.
Fig. 9. Overview of the guarantee networks. Zoom in for more details.
Guarantee Network tessellation. As the statistics shows, many of
the networks are composed of tens or hundreds of nodes, with rare
networks are composed of thousands of nodes [30]. The naive force-
direct graph layout visuals the whole data set as a hairball and intro-
duce serious visual clutters. We design a grid layout to tessellate the
guarantee networks as Fig. 9 shows. In detail, the networks are laid
in an order of their complexity (the number of nodes) for the com-
mon prejudice that it is more prone for the complex network induce
large-scale corporate defaults (see Concern 2 in Section 3.1).
Interactions. Rich interactions including brushing, zooming in/out,
view panning, and dragging interactions are supported. The zoom-
ing operation supports to navigate the networks at different level-of-
details. The panning operation enables to view the detailed profiles of
the node. The dragging operation enables to explore the networks in
the canvas. Some more enhanced interaction tools are developed to
support in-depth analysis of the networks. In the bottom part of GNE
view of Fig. 1, from left to right, they are: 1) Expanding view. 2) Risk
Badge trigger. The risk badges are visual symbolling of the contagion
risk of the overall network. When the risk badge trigger button is on,
all the risk badge will be overlayed on the networks, to help the experts
to locate the interest networks. More details please refer to the follow-
ing section. 3) Box selection. Users can select the network of interest
and highlight the nodes and edges, and make the CEM, CIE, and NIE
view to display the corresponding content. 4) Edge width trigger. The
edge width trigger is proportional to the guarantee amount. It is use-
ful when analysis specific networks. Furthermore, we define buttons
for two reasons: the first is to get better performance when loading
all networks; the second one is the width of the edge is not apparent
in the Network tessellation view. 5) Colour palette. The node can be
coloured by default rate (Graph neural network based prediction and
will be reported in our other papers), type, and size of businesses.
5.2 Visual Symbolling of Contagion Effect
Addressing the requirement (T.2, T.4) and based on the behaviour of
contagion, we create the Contagion Effect – a novel financial metric to
quantify the severities of the risk of contagion pattern. Based on the
core metric, we design a Contagion Effect Matrix view to encode the
risks of each network in a matrix manner. It also works as a filter for
chain-level analysis. It is further abstracted into the Contagion Effect
Badge – a visual symbolling to chart the risk levels in the GNE view.
In economics and finance, the contagion effect explains the impact
of such spreading crisis in a situation where a shock in a particular
economy or region spreads out and affects others [1, 45, 6, 29, 12].
However, as far as we know, previously there is no measurements to
quantify the contagion effect in the guarantee network problem. In
this paper, we identify the contagion risk for the networked loans as
an important yet unexplored interdisciplinary research problem. We
explicitly define the contagion effect of pattern Pi as:
Ei ∝ fi ∗ vi (1)
Where the fi is the frequency of the contagion chain pattern and
vi is the length of the contagion chain pattern. In practice, networks
may have various composition of contagion chain patterns, and that
means the default may spread drastically different. The frequency fi
describes how much risk induced by pattern Pi, and vi describes at
most how many other nodes it may infect. By quantifying the conta-
gion effects, the patterns are arranged in the contagion effect matrix.
Contagion Effect Matrix (CEM). It is designed to visualize the
contagion effect of the patterns in a network. As Fig. 10 shows, the
column is the length v of the contagion chain pattern. The rows are the
frequency fi of the contagion chain pattern, where we use the count
of instances of the pattern directly. In the view, all the patterns are
spatially arranged into the four quadrants by the behaviour of conta-
gion. Each quadrant is encoded a risk level colour (consistent with the
colour specification in the financial sector), and the colours form the
basis of the risk badge. Besides, each cell also displays the count of the
instance of this pattern for a selected network on the left-top corner.
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Fig. 10. Contagion effect matrix, where the patterns are arranged by the
behaviour of contagion.
We category them into the four kinds of behaviour of contagion by
the range of influence and the vulnerable level. In detail: Q.I: For
chain-like patterns (P.1 and P.2 patterns), the default can only spread
across the single chain. Usually such nodes and default will not lead
to massive default and relatively easy to break the contagion path by
removing the key node on the chain. Q.II: For mutual-like patterns
(P.3 and P.4 patterns), the defaults can infect each other (P.3, P.4). Such
patterns are vulnerable as the mutual guarantee existence. Q.III: For
loop-mutual-like patterns (P.5 and P.6 patterns), the default may be
spread more easier than the chain-like and mutual-like patterns as the
existence of loop mutual guarantee. Q.IV: B.4. For star-like patterns
(P.7 and P.8 patterns), the default on the centre chain position may
affect all the supporting corporations. Such kinds of contagion may
affect large number of companies.
The layout of the CEM is meaningful: Firstly, the patterns on the
left half of CEM are more vulnerable to crisis due to the existence of
loop-mutual pattern and broader Range of Influence as more nodes are
involved in a network than the right half patterns. The experts may,
in practice, wish to have more guarantee patterns in the right half of
CEM for a more stable situation. Secondly, the patterns in different
quadrants can be converted between each other in the real situation,
and this provides clues to take decomposition strategy when splitting
the complex network into pieces to avoid the potential systematic risks.
For example, the mutual-like patterns are more basic ones of the Loop-
mutual-like patterns, and when splitting the network during the risk
outbreak, we can remove the nodes with a pattern in Q.III and generate
the patterns in Q.II even in the Q.I.
Contagious Effect Badge (CEB) The contagion chain patterns ex-
tensively exist in each of the guarantee network. Quantifying the pro-
portional composition can help to identify the type of contagion risk.
The patterns can be integrated effectively with the financial indicators
such as the ones in the Capital Accord for a better risk level assess-
ment of guarantee networks. We explicitly define the contagion score
as a four dimensional vector [EDA, pq1, pq2, pq3, pq4], where EDA
is the total amount exposure of the nodes in the network; pq j is the
percentage share of instances in this kind of behaviour of contagion.
Contagious Effect Badge is designed as a four-slice pie chart to
symbolling the risk levels based on the contagion score. The size of
CEB are proportional to the relative exposure risk ratio (compare to the
maximum exposure in all the guarantee networks). The portion of each
share of CEB are encoded as pq j to charting the contagion behaviours.
The badge can be overlayed on the networks in the GNE view (Fig. 11)
and enable the users to locate network of interest quickly.
Fig. 11. Overlaying the CEB on the networks in the GNE view let the
users to locate interest network quickly. The size and colour of CEB
are encoded as the relative exposure ratio and the contagion types.
Note that, the risk levels are not consistent with the complexity of the
networks, and users need only choose the network of interest by the
CEB. It is emphasised in the training session during the case studies.
5.3 Chain Instance Explorer
The Chain Instance Explorer (CIE) is a tailored financial coordi-
nate system for the middle-level (contagion chain) risk analysis. A
flower-petal-zooming interaction is designed to distinguish the chain
instances of a same pattern by their financial metrics.
Fig. 12 (a) shows the designed financial coordinate system, where
the y-axis is the exposure and x-axis is the total guarantee amount of
the chain. Each flower in the financial coordinate system represents a
chain instances. In practice, multiple nodes may have the same expo-
sure and guarantee amount (the cause refer to Section 3.1) and occlude
each other. Thus, we propose a flower-petal-zooming visualisation de-
sign for the coincident object selection problem. Each chain instance
is designed as a petal shape node in the financial coordinate system.
When multiple petals get together on the coordinate system, they form
a flower. The number in the centre shows the counts of coincident
chains. Each petal is clickable for the users to select the chain in-
stances in other views. The design intension is to avoid the possible
visual clutter by iterative brush and zooming interactions are supported
for selection in extreme dense cases (Fig. 12 (c)). The CIE is coordi-
nated with CEM and GNE, enabling financial experts to explore the
contagion chains case-by-case.
(a) Chain Instance Explorer (b) Nodes are visualized as flows when coincide
Exposure
Guarantee Amount
 (c) Dense example case for the flower-petal-zooming interactions
Fig. 12. Chain Instance Explorer. (a) financial coordinate system; (b)
visuals the contagion chains when multiple nodes are coincident. (c)
dense example case for the flower-petal-zooming interactions.
5.4 Node Instance Explorer
In order to facilitate the low-level (node) detail on-demand finest grain
analysis of the guaranteed loans, we provide the node instance ex-
plorer. It is composed of the following five tabs in Fig. 13:
Fig. 13. Node Instance Explorer is composed of (a) Node projection
view; (b) Financial distribution view; (c) Overall picture view, ordered
bubbles along exposures, to give an overview; Detailed view by busi-
ness size and type are similar to (c) and omitted for space limitation.
In detail, they are 1) Node projection tab. It overviews the com-
panies by their guarantee networks structure similarities. The nodes
are first represented to be vectors by node2vec [19] and then projected
by t-SNE visualisation [43]. Box brush interaction is supported for
coordinated analysis. 2) Financial distributions tab. Four important
financial statistics (exposure, registered capital, business size and type
) are provided. The histograms are visualized by cross-filters to en-
able a further fine-tuning by including or excluding records. More
sophisticated indicators may be included in the deployed system. 3)
The overall picture tab. The repulsed bubbles (corporations) are laid
along their exposure (amount of debt) axis to prevent visual clutters.
The bubble sizes are proportional to the corporation registered capital.
When a user clicks a bubble, the contagion chain will be displayed
in GNE. 4) Detailed view by business size and type both are further
refined charts by business size and type to the overview picture tab.
5.5 Coordinated Interactions
Coordinated interactions can draw hidden knowledge through the
iConVis system. Highly interactions are supported, and all the four
main views are coordinated to facility the level-of-detail exploration
of the networks, comparison of contagion patterns, instances, and spe-
cific businesses. Figure 4 gives the analysis procedure. It supports
a cycle analysis between the high-level (massive networks level), the
middle-level (contagion chain level), and the low-level (independent
node level). By such analysis procedure, the users can finally under-
stand the networks and the contagion patterns in an iterative way.
6 CASE STUDY
We conducted case studies to evaluate the effectiveness and usability
of the proposed system and approach. Before the case studies, we
conducted a training session to walk the experts through our system,
including the visual encodings and user interactions. After that, the ex-
perts explored the contagion patterns with the system and investigated
their subjects of interest. In these case studies, the experts obtained
valuable insights to the contagious problem. We then interviewed both
experts to collect their comments and feedback.
6.1 Case 1: Network Level Contagion Risk Assessment
As there may exist thousands of guarantee networks composed of tens
of thousands of nodes/links. Usually, the financial experts can only
adopt an ad-hoc approach: start from a node and follow the vine to
analysis the whole neighbours. This is a bottom-up methodology, and
the experts do not have the big picture as a whole. Thus, it is difficult
for the domain experts to dive into the massive data and analyse what
they are interested in. The iConVis system grants them the ability to
overturn the analysis strategy. Below is the analysis procedure and
conclusions from the expert Ea.
Initially, the expert was attracted by the contagion risk matrix as it
is in the central position with bright colours (Fig. 14 View C.1.a). He
familiarise with the red-green credit risk colour setting. By default, the
numbers along the rows are the instances count of the patterns that are
arranged by the length (columns of CEB). He observed the numbers
of the contagion risk matrix for a short while and gave the overview
contagion risk comments (from a top analysis perspective). The main
insights drawn by the expert include: (a). The main contagion risk
comes from the star-like patterns and loop-mutual-like patterns ( there
are a large number of instances in P.5 – P.8). This means the revolv-
ing guarantee and joint liability guarantee (See definitions in Fig.7 in
our previous work [30]) is common in practice. While other patterns
such as star shape guarantee are relatively stable from the contagion
risk perspective. In practice, the star shape guarantee usually shaped
by professional guarantee company; the joint liability guarantee may
be formed by subsidiaries and parent companies, and the revolving
guarantee may be formed by peer size businesses. For different kinds
of guarantee patterns and contagion patterns, the different resolving
strategy should be adopted. (b). There are more instances in P.7, P.8
patterns than that of P.5 and P.6. This is caused of more joint liability
guarantees than revolving guarantees in practice. And in case of pre-
venting large-scale corporate defaults, it is more urgent for the experts
to cut the contagion chain to prevent more business are dragged down.
(c). The contagious risks are not proportional to the complexity of the
guarantee network (see the GNE view of the Fig. 14 View C.1.a ). The
expert emphasis it is an important discovery – it corrects the misunder-
standing in the financial sector that the more complex the networks are
more dangerous. The GNE view demonstrates that the CEB can effec-
tively represent the risk composition and provides a clue for selecting
the priority of analysis.
Next, the expert continues further analysis from the view of GNE,
and Fig. 14 View C.1.b and C.1.c gives the two selected networks.
The expert first clicks the CEB button to overlay all the risk badges
on the networks. From the view C.1.a, he quickly locates the two
networks. Although the eleven guarantee networks all have compli-
cated network structures, from the size and composition of colours of
the badge, the expert can get an overview how serious is the risk, and
what type of risk exists in this network. For other networks in view
C.1.a, their badges either have more proportion in green (composed of
simple structures) or have a smaller radius (less exposure at risk). So,
the first network is prioritized as a network of interest.
Both the networks are composed of a similar number of nodes but
radically different network structures. Contrary to earlier assumptions,
the network in C.1.b is more prioritized to be analysed than that in
C.1.c although it looks simpler in the network structure. The number
in CEM (see the arrow in blue in Fig. 14) confirms that the network in
C.1.b has much more instances of Star-like patterns and Loop-mutual-
like patterns. This induces lots of contagion risk during economy
down period. Besides, the CEB of C.1.b is larger than that of C.1.c
means there is more exposure in the former guarantee network and
should attract more attention from the banks.
This case study is to validate the usefulness of the contagious effect
matrix and the extended visual symbolling of contagious effect badge
on a top-down analysis procedure.
C1.a
C1.b
C1.c
Fig. 14. The analysis starts from the overview of contagion risk to net-
work of interest selection and compare. Zoom in for the numbers.
6.2 Case 2: Chain Level Contagion Risk Analysis
Then, the expert move to analysis the chain level contagion risk. He
highlight the network of interest (C.1.b in Fig 14) and faint others. The
network is composed of the contagion patterns in the CEB. Specially,
it is composed of 19 instances of P.8 pattern, 8 instances of P.6 pattern,
and 4 instances of P.7 pattern. This means that the network is vul-
nerable during a crisis and may influence lots of nodes. The numbers
provides the risk behaviour and guide the preventative measurements
for the possible large-scale corporate defaults. He needs to analysis
the contagion chains case by case because their financial information
are different and thus have different risks.
So he choose to analysis the instances in pattern P.8, as Fig. 15
shows. In the view of CIE, the exerts observed that although there
are multiple of similar chains, some of them lie on the x-axis, and this
means there is no exposure at risk (all the funds are repaid to the bank).
There are some nodes on the upper part of the coordinate system, and
they require to be analysed. So, the experts zoom in the upper part
(C.2.b) and click the nodes to view the chains. Correspondingly, the
contagion chain in C.2.c and C.2.d are in red.
C.2.a
C.2.b C.2.c C.2.d
Fig. 15. Contagion chain level risk analysis.
The two contagion chains attracted the attention of the experts.
They explain that both are complex structure composed of the Star-
ext (see Fig. 7). Such shapes are complex and difficult to be extracted
by traditional ad-hoc examine. Since both chains are vulnerable and
have a high range of influence in case of default spread, they should
be taken care of especially during the economy down period. For ex-
ample, from the contagion risk perspective, we can keep the financial
stable by providing individual financial aid or cut the network at the
blue triangle labelled nodes, as they are in the pivot position, suggested
by the experts. While in practice, taking preventive measures should
consider more sophisticated situations, and the NIE view will provide
more practical financial information for decision making.
The study above validated the closed-loop analysis process and iter-
ative level of detail exploration specified in Fig. 4 (c). The experts will
not get lost in the ocean of network data, and on the contrary, they can
quickly locate the interested guarantee network, and the tool provides
them with an in-depth analysis of the risk patterns. Besides, differ-
ent from perceptual knowledge, it is not more risk for a network with
more nodes as the network structure and financial information are also
critical for the assessment. The symbolling of contagious effect pro-
vides intuitive and effective representation–such visual encoding help
to save much energy for experts when analysing.
6.3 Expert Interviews
After the case studies, we conducted informal interviews with the ex-
perts and gathered their comments and feedback regarding the system
usability, visualisation design, system interactions.
System Usability: The system received highly endorsement by
both experts. Both of them are agreed and approbate with the con-
tagion chain risk metric, the visual design, and the analysis loop. Ea
said the analysis approach and the system beyond enhanced their anal-
ysis capabilities. Since it is extended on the widely accepted Capital
Accord risk management system, although there are some novel con-
cepts such as Risk Badge, Contagion Risk Matrix, and others, they are
easy to be understood and accepted by the financial experts. Also, ex-
perts Eb expressed the same idea. They have no difficult to grasp the
key ideas and utilize the concepts to analysis.
Visualisation design: Both experts expressed a preference for the
overall deisgn. The light yellow background design gives a sense of
spirituality and encourages creativity. What they most like is the risk
badge idea. They prised the risk badge is a powerful abstraction of
what they want. With such intuitive symbols, they need not to use the
mouse wheel to flip excel page by page and get lost, by their words.
Besides, the expert like the compact and informative design of the
views. They like the design of the grid layout to tessellate the guar-
antee networks, as it is clear, concise, and provides all the necessary
information. The petal and flower design in the CIE (Fig. 12), attracted
their interest, although, at the first attempts, some of them ignored this.
It combines beauty and functionality, they praised. However, they also
suggest that it could be more intuitive to give the overview of all the
networks in one screen such as in Fig. 9 in the system. Currently, they
need to use the mouse to drag the canvas to see all the networks and
there is no slider or other hint in the GNE view.
System Interactions: Experts believe that the interactions in the
views presented by our system are useful to them and can help them
explore and analyze based on their experience. The interactions be-
tween multiple coordinated views facilities the closed-loop analysis
process and iterative level of detail exploration. Besides, there are sev-
eral functional buttons and selection/zooming interaction supported in
each view. They are powerful, but make the system a bit complex, said
one expert. However, it is difficult to make a proper trade-off between
complex functions and powerful analysis abilities, he complimented.
Due to the sophisticated interactions and massive amount of data vi-
sualized, the performance of the system operates not always smooth,
and this is the main imperfection by the experts.
7 DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss the significance, limitations and future work
of the developed visual analysis system iConVis.
Significance Decoding the risk behind the complex network struc-
ture and provide evidence to the preventative measurements for large
scale corporate defaults has significant social and theoretical mean-
ings. We identify the contagion chain analysis, from a data-driven
perspective, as a feasible way to understand the contagion properties
in the networked-guarantee loans. We propose systematic analysis ap-
proach including the definition of contagion risk metric and behaviour
of contagion in the networked guarantee loans to rich the theoretical
framework. From the data mining aspect, we discover and report eight
interpretable contagion patterns by analysing the real-world bank loan
records. The patterns can help to analysis the behaviour of contagion
and provide the basis of risk assessment to the guarantee networks.
From visual analysis aspect, we propose iConVis, a powerful inter-
actions and intuitive metaphor visualisation designed tool. Empirical
case studies based on real-world financial guarantee loan data confirm
the usefulness and significance to the real-world problem. The results
by our system deepen the understanding of the guarantee network and
provide a basis to prevent large-scale corporate defaults.
Limitations Despite the above advantages of iConVis, there are still
some limitations for some technical aspects. A major limitation is the
performance. It has to make a trade-off between highly interactive
and amount of information that can be rendered on a single page. We
choose to visualize the massive networks on SVG instead of CANVAS
and WebGL as it has the best interaction support. In practice, the per-
formance is acceptable for a prototype system and further performance
optimization will be required for the deployed system.
Future work The future work will further extend the behaviour of
contagion and facility the systematic risk management and large scale
corporate default intervention in a visual analysis way. The dynamic
of the guarantee network will be considered for a more accurate risk
assessment.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we report our progress on the risk management for the
Networked-guarantee Loans problem. We believe that this is the first
work to identify and formalize the contagion chain risk management
problem for the networked loans. The new research problem provides
refreshing research opportunities for both computing and financial
communities. In our work, a novel financial metric – contagion effect,
is formulated to quantify the infectious consequence of the guarantee
chains in the network. Based on the metric, we design and imple-
ment a serial of novel and coordinated views to address the analysis
the financial problem. Experts evaluated the system using real-world
financial data. The results can deepen the understanding and assess
the potential contagion risk behind the complex network structures to
prevent potential large-scale corporate defaults.
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